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In this paper, we take advantage of Korea’s unique experiment with mandatory audit firm 
rotation (MAFR) and mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) to ascertain their influence on 
audit quality, proxied by conditional conservatism. Overall, we find that the implementation of 
MAFR did not have the desired effect. Firms that adopted MAFR demonstrate higher levels of 
conservatism in previous periods, under MAPR (or compared to voluntary adopters). 
Furthermore, we find that audit tenure increases conservatism levels consistent with the 
auditor expertise hypothesis. However, whilst evidence suggests MAFR decreases audit quality 
on the whole, we find that firms that switch from Non-Big4 to Big4 auditors demonstrate higher 
conservatism because Big4 auditors are more likely to demand conservative accounting 
practices, consistent with Big4 audit firm knowledge-superiority. Overall, the results suggest 
that MAFR’s negative effect on audit quality can be mitigated by Big4 auditor supervision. 
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I. Introduction 
Following the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and several high-profile firm defaults between 
2001 and 2003, the South Korean government has experimented with numerous audit 
policies to improve accounting quality. In this paper, we examine the differing levels of 
accounting conservatism under two different audit rules, mandatory audit firm rotation 
(MAFR henceforth) and mandatory audit partner rotation MAPR (henceforth). Further, we 
test whether switching from non-Big4 to Big4 auditors can improve audit quality.  
  MAPR is a rule that requires a firm to rotate an audit partner within the same audit firm. 
The benefits of MAPR is that client specific knowledge can be transferred to incoming audit 




potential for collusion. Based on the entrenchment hypothesis, audit firms are more likely to 
impair their independence and reduce audit quality to retain business. The MAFR policy 
requires firms to periodically change audit firm. MAFR can be considered a policy with the 
potential to reduce collusion between audit firms and clients. The South Korean context is 
unique because South Korea is the very first to adopt MAFR based on the auditor 
entrenchment hypothesis after SOX in 2002. MAPR was adopted on a voluntary rolling basis. 
Therefore, it is possible to compare the same firm under different auditing regimes in two 
different periods, the MAPR sample (2000–2005), and the MAFR sample (2006-2009). 
Where possible, we compare MAFR firms with firms that rotate their auditor voluntarily 
(VOLR henceforth). 
Our study is motivated by three caveats. First, in recent years, there has been controversy 
whether mandatory audit firm rotation is associated with an incremental increase in audit 
quality. The majority of previous studies investigate the association between audit firm 
tenure and audit quality, testing the expertise vs entrenchment hypothesis; however, these 
studies fail to find the consistent evidence. Previous studies attempt to examine the effect of 
an auditor rotation regime; but do not compare the direct effect of audit partner rotation vs 
audit firm rotation. In most countries, the key question is whether mandatory audit firm 
rotation can incrementally improve audit quality under the current mandatory audit partner 
rotation rule when practiced. Because audit firms and corporations (for example in Korea) 
believe that the audit partner rotation rule is already sufficient to have the desired effect 
whereas regulators such as PCAOB still insist the need for MAFR, it is important to directly 
examine the incremental effect of MAFR on audit quality whilst the existing MAPR is in effect. 
South Korea’s unique experience provides a perfect environment for this comparison since 
it’s the only country that adopted MAFR while retaining MAPR since SOX, 2002. 
Second, our study is also motivated by the opposing policy decisions made by the world’s 
two largest economic regions, the U.S. and the E.U. The PCAOB suggested that U.S. firms 
should be required to adopt mandatory audit firm rotation; however the rule has been 
rejected by legislators because the social and financial costs were considered to out-weigh 
the benefits of a “fresh look”. The EU has approved a mandatory audit firm rotation rule that 
requires audit firms to rotate engagements with public interest entities every 10 years. 
Therefore, the gap between the U.S. and the EU in knowledge or belief about the incremental 
effect of MAFR can be regarded as of importance to potential countries that consider MAFR 
adoption. Third, the incremental effect of MAFR on audit quality can vary depending on the 
audit firm switch type or the length of the auditor-client relationship prior to rotation. The 




these important dimensions. Our study is motivated by whether Non-big4 to Big4 switch 
type and consecutive audit tenure before the rotation significantly influences the effect of 
MAFR on audit quality.  
Based on the above motivation statements, we develop this study to answer three questions. 
First, we examine the incremental effect of MAFR on accounting quality proxied by 
accounting conservatism. In a Korean setting, there is evidence that MAFR has decreased 
audit quality using abnormal accruals as proxies for audit quality (Kwon et al., 2014). 
However, we are the first to examine the influence of mandatory audit rotation on 
conservatism in South Korea. In South Korea, MAFR was implemented based on the 
entrenchment hypothesis, the belief that familiarity may cause auditors and clients to 
collude which leads to an impairment of auditor independence. To establish the potential 
positive/negative effect of MAFR on audit quality, we test whether the levels of conditional 
conservatism will be different after firms adopt mandatory audit firm rotation. Using mean-
difference tests and conditional conservatism regression analysis, we find that after the 
adoption of MAFR, a firm’s conservatism level decreases compared to prior periods under 
the MAPR rule. Furthermore, we find that firms that adopted MAFR are less conservative 
than firms that voluntarily rotated their auditors. These results suggest that MAFR did not 
have the desired effect in South Korea. Based on the entrenchment hypothesis, the South 
Korean government would expect accounting conservatism to increase after MAFR. However, 
we find evidence conservatism decreases consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. 
Secondly, we directly test the auditor expertise/entrenchment hypothesis by examining 
the relationship between audit tenure and conditional conservatism. There is evidence that 
audit tenure increases (Johnson et al., 2002; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Myers et al., 
2003; Lee et al., 2009; Turel et al., 2017) and decreases with audit quality (Deis and Giroux, 
1992; 1998; Ryan et al., 2001; Casterella et al., 2002; Elder et al., 2015, Blandon and Bosch, 
2015). To test the expertise/entrenchment hypothesis, we use a dummy variable approach 
to compare the level of conservatism of firms with audit tenures of more than 8 years and 
firms with audit tenures of less than 8 years. We find that the levels of conservatism for firms 
with audit tenures of more than 8 years are higher than firms with lower tenures. These 
results are again consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. 
   Thirdly, we test the influence of Big4 auditors on a firm’s conservative practices. Auditors 
prefer conservative accounting practices (Lys and Watts, 1994; Chi and Weng, 2014). Studies 
show the audit quality of Big4 auditors is higher than Non-Big4 because of potential litigation 
risk (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 1998; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Behn et al., 2008). Big4 




high levels of accumulated accounting knowledge, are not income dependent on large clients 
and have major incentives to avoid reputational damage (DeAngelo, 1981; Basu et al., 2001). 
We find that the level of conservatism of firms that are rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 
auditors increase compared to other switch types. The results show that the positive effect 
of the Non-Big4 to Big4 switch type outweighs the negative effect of mandatory audit firm 
rotation on audit quality, consistent with Big4 audit firm knowledge-superiority. 
Cameran et al.’s (2016) study of Italian firms is the study that is most closely related with 
ours. They compare the audit quality of firms using accrual based conservatism proxies to 
compare audit quality in 3 different MAPR tenures (9 years). They find that auditors demand 
higher levels of conservatism in the final MAPR three-year period compared to the previous 
two MAPR periods because auditors have an incentive to ‘clean up’ financial statements 
before handing them to a new audit firm. Our study differs from Cameran et al., (2016) 
because we compare the accounting conservatism practices of MAPR firms that 
subsequently adopt MAFR. To the best of our knowledge, we are the very first to compare 
the accounting conservative practices of firms that have been mandated to adopt the 
mandatory audit firm rotation rule after the mandatory audit partner rule with 
consideration of audit tenure and switch type effect. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we provide consistent evidence in 
favor of the auditor expertise hypothesis suggesting that the benefits of a ‘fresh look’ has a 
more serious effect on audit quality compared to perceived collusion between auditors and 
clients. Overall, our results suggest that the establishment of MAFR in South Korea based on 
the auditor entrenchment hypothesis was miss-specified. With regards to conservatism, 
MAFR had a negative effect in South Korea. Second, we contribute to the ongoing debate 
about auditor tenure relating to the auditor entrenchment / expertise hypothesis. Whilst the 
literature regarding the relationship between audit tenure is mixed, we find evidence that in 
a Korean setting audit tenure has a positive effect on audit quality and enhances 
conservatism practices. This evidence is also consistent with the auditor expertise 
hypothesis. Finally, we contribute to audit partner/firm rotation studies with evidence that 
whilst MAFR has had a negative effect on audit quality, the incremental negative effect can 
be reduced in situations where firms are rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 auditors. This 
evidence supports the argument that a reduction in audit quality may be related to the 
auditor’s specific knowledge rather than the rotation process itself. Thus, overall, we find 
evidence that increased cumulative specific audit knowledge has the potential to increase a 
firm’s conservatism; however, results suggest that MAFR’s negative effect on audit quality 




   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review the Korean 
institutional setting, relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In section III, we explain the 
research design. In section IV, we explain the results of empirical tests. In section V, we 
present additional robustness tests. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Previous Literatures and Hypotheses 
2.1 The Korean Institutional Setting 
Relative to developed markets, Korea’s legal enforcement can be considered weak (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Woods, 2013). Because of the Korea’s comparatively weak regulation, the 
government has experimented with several audit policies. Prior to 1982, under the ‘auditor 
designation rule’, the SSB (Securities Supervisory Board, the predecessor of FSC) assigned 
firms with an auditor of their choosing. In 1982, firms were given an opportunity to select an 
audit firm under the ‘free audit engagement rule’. This decision was in-line with international 
trends, the increased interdependence of global markets and the need for accounting 
information to be comparable globally (see Lee et al., 2013). After the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, the FSC introduced legislation to require firms to retain auditors for three consecutive 
years with the purpose of protecting auditor independence by preventing conflict between 
clients and audit firms. Furthermore, the FSC also introduced a rule to rotate partners within 
an audit firm every five years to prevent familiarity threats based on the assumption of the 
auditor entrenchment hypothesis. In 2000, after investigators discovered that window 
dressing contributed to the demise of Daewoo, one of Korea’s largest conglomerates in 1999, 
the FSC strengthen MAPR by requiring firms to rotate audit partners every 3 years. 
In 2003, a period in which firms were under mandatory partner rotation legislation, 
earnings manipulation and overstatement of earnings caused successive bankruptcies of 
large Korean firms known as chaebols. As a result, in 2003, the SSB promulgated the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy (MAFR), further strengthening safeguards against 
familiarity threats. MAFR required firms to rotate their “audit firm” every 6 years. MAFR 
became fully effective in 2006, but only lasted for 5 years until 2010. MAFR was terminated 
in 2010 with the adoption of IFRS (2009/3) because of the additional expense of practicing 
two different types of regulation. The adoption of MAFR was influenced by the passage of 
SOX, in the U.S.A, in 2002. In 2003, the American legislative body, PCAOB was established to 
examine the benefits of MAFR; however, the policy has not been adopted in the U.S. on the 




Therefore, South Korea’s unique experiment provides an opportunity to compare the 
levels of accounting conservatism between MAFR (2006-2009) and the audit quality of two 
benchmark groups, MAPR the same firm in prior periods (2000-2005), and firms that adopt 
the policy on a voluntary basis (VOLR) in MAFR periods (2006-2009). MAFR and MAPR have 
significantly different bases and implications. MAPR and MAFR are considered a safeguard 
against familiarity threats; however, based on the entrenchment hypothesis, MAFR can be 
considered a more robust safeguard because the rule requires a firm to adopt a “new audit 
firm”. The basis for MAFR adoption is the potential reduction of collusive relationships 
between clients and audit firms at the expense of a loss of accumulated client specific 
knowledge; the basis of MAPR is the retention of client specific knowledge under the 
supervision of a different partner, preventing the loss of firm-specific knowledge. Therefore, 
a key question is whether the benefit of preventing familiarity threats to protect auditor 
independence exceeds the cost of deteriorating auditor expertise due to the loss of client 
specific knowledge. It is theorized that the close relationship between auditors and clients 
was the cause of numerous firm bankruptcies. A regular change in audit partner was believed 
to reduce collusion between clients and audit firms. As a result, a “fresh look” was believed 
to improve the audit quality of South Korea generally. However, South Korea is the first 
country to adopt MAFR after the high profile accounting scandals and passage of SOX in 2002. 
South Korea mandated MAFR when very little was known about its effect on conservatism. 
Critics of MAFR believe that MAFR is more likely to reduce audit quality because of the loss 
of firm specific knowledge. The potential influence of MAFR on accounting quality is an 
ongoing debate.  
2.2 Previous Literature 
MAPR is relatively wide spread globally. However, MAFR is only practiced in a handful of 
countries such as Brazil, Italy and more recently the E.U. An important consideration for the 
implementation of the mandatory firm rotation policy is the potential collusive behavior 
between audit firms and their clients based on the auditor entrenchment hypothesis. In the 
literature, a consensus has not been established regarding the relationship between audit 
tenure and audit quality. Proponents of audit firm rotation believe that familiarity between 
auditors and clients impairs auditor independence consistent with audit quality decreasing 
with audit tenure (Deis and Giroux, 1992; 1998; Ryan et al., 2001; Casterella et al., 2002; 




On the other hand, opponents of mandatory audit firm rotation believe that audit firm 
rotation can lead to a loss of audit knowledge. Based on the audit expertise hypothesis, there 
is evidence that audit failures are more likely to occur in the initial stages of audit tenure due 
to a loss of cumulative knowledge (Peirre and Anderson, 1984; Arrunada and PazAres, 1997; 
Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Cercello and Nagy, 2004; Chen et al., 2008). Numerous studies 
find that as audit quality increases with audit tenure (Johnson et al., 2002; Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2009; Turel et al., 2017).  
Numerous studies directly examine the effect of the mandatory auditor rotation. For 
instance, Chi and Huang (2005) demonstrate that a firm’s earnings quality is lower in the 
early stages of audit tenure after audit partner rotation. Carey and Simnett (2006) find that 
after partner rotation, there is an increased propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion. 
Chi et al. (2009) find no evidence that MAPR enhances audit quality; however, mandatory 
audit firm rotation entails significantly higher costs to both firms and auditors. Lennox et al. 
(2014) find that audit partners are motivated to ‘clean up’ financial statements before 
handing them over to a new partner. Kwon et al. (2014) compare the audit quality of Korean 
firms before and after 2006 using earnings management measures to compare long vs short 
term audit tenure samples. They find that audit fees after MAFR are statistically significantly 
higher after 2006.  
Recent studies report more interesting findings. For instances, Arthur et al., (2017) 
suggest auditor rotation can enhance audit quality but only when both the incoming audit 
partner and the audit firm are industry specialists. Bell et al. (2015) find evidence of an 
unconventional ‘U’ shaped relationship between accounting quality and audit tenure. Thus, 
overall the relation between audit tenure and audit quality is mixed. 
The majority of audit rotation studies almost exclusively focus on the accruals earnings 
management as proxies for audit quality because managing earnings is a measure of upside 
opportunity. Accounting conservatism reflects a firm’s tendency to recognize “bad news” in 
a timelier manner than “good news” (Basu, 1997; Brown et al., 2001). Conservatism reduces 
a manager’s opportunistic behavior and optimistic financial reporting (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). Overall, accounting conservatism reduces downside risk. However, the cost and 
benefits of conservatism practices on financial statement data depends on the information 
users. There is evidence that conditional conservatism misinterprets financial performance 
(Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Accounting conservatism reduces the value relevance of financial 
statement data to reflect future stock prices (Collins et al., 1997; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; 
Francis and Schipper, 1999; Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Barth et al., 2001). Moreover, 




et al., 2014). Furthermore, conservatism is associated with increased analyst’s errors (Pae 
and Thornton, 2010; Mensah et al., 2004; Louis et al., 2014). Overall, the 'cost' of accounting 
conservatism is perceived from a potential equity holder valuation perspective because 
conservatism has the potential to affect upside opportunity or potential gain on investment. 
    On the other hand, accounting conservatism can be considered beneficial to debt 
holders and the general (Xie, 2015). Information about downside risk is more important to 
lenders than upside opportunity because they are interested in the worst possible outcome 
(Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003; Zhang, 2008; Wittenberg-Moreman, 2008). Furthermore, 
from a corporate governance standpoint, downward bias on profits requires a higher degree 
of variability that reduces the opportunity for managers to manipulate compensation 
packages (Watts, 2003; O’Connell, 2006). Given the 'worst case scenario' basis of 
conservative accounting, the practice increases investment efficiency (Louis et al., 2012). 
LaFond and Watts (2008) theorize that market participants demand conservatism. 
Withholding gains may increase uncertainty, however recognizing losses immediately 
decreases information asymmetry (Francis et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Ruch and Taylor, 
2015). Therefore, considering the establishment of SOX was influenced by the demise of 
Enron and Worldcom, conservatism is in the interest of the general public because limiting 
downside risk decreases the role of government in firm bankruptcy. Conservatism reduces 
the opportunity for equity holders to estimate investment opportunity from a valuation 
standpoint, conservatism as a measure of downside risk is in the best interest of the general 
public as a measure of audit quality.  
Accounting conservatism is considered to be an important accounting practice that 
validates financial reporting (Watts, 2003; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008; Zhong and Li, 2016). Audit quality can be defined as the combined 
probability of technical capability and auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981). Detecting 
financial mismanagement is related to technical capability and is the primary objective of an 
auditor, thus auditors play an important role in determining earnings quality. Conservatism 
reduces auditors’ liability exposure and induces auditors to increase the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in recognizing economic losses (Basu et al, 2001). Hence, audit firms 
could demand higher earnings quality by demanding more conservative reporting by their 
clients even in the case of increased audit risk (threat of auditor independence). Therefore, 
under the assumption that auditors provide audit services independent of the demands of 
their clients, managers' opportunistic behavior is restricted if firms exercises conservative 
reporting (especially aggressive reporting). Numerous archival studies on audit quality find 




Chung et al., 2003; Francis and Wang, 2008), consistent with Simnet et al. (2016) who 
recently review 130 archival auditing studies for the past 20 years and summarize the 
measures of audit quality; thus, conditional accounting conservatism can be used as a 
plausible proxy for audit quality. 
Numerous previous studies examine the effect of mandatory auditor rotation using 
conditional accounting conservatism as a proxy for audit quality. The results are mixed. 
Kramer et al. (2011) find that conservatism decreases as a firms audit tenure increases. 
Jenkins and Velury (2008) find a positive association between conservatism and the 
relationship between auditor and client. Zerni etl al. (2012) document that an auditor’s deep 
expertise is not transferable across audit partners but tied into an audit partner’s private 
human capital which can lead to a reduction in audit quality. Cameran et al. (2016) is the 
study most closely associated with ours. They compare the audit quality of Italian firms using 
conservatism models as proxies for earnings quality. Italy has enacted a rule in which firms 
must rotate audit partners every three years for 9 years. After 9 years, the client firm must 
rotate audit firms. They divide their sample into 3 separate 3 year periods to compare the 
audit quality of partner rotation in the first two audit partner tenures with the last. They 
show that the conservatism level of the firm in the final MAPR period is higher compared to 
the two preceding periods. In the first two MAPR periods, auditors were under less pressure 
to impair their judgment compared to the final period when auditors have an incentive to 
‘clean up’ the financial statements in preparation for new auditors. Cameran et al. (2016) 
find that before Italian firms are required to transfer financial accountants to new auditors, 
they increase their levels of conservatism in comparison to other periods. Our study differs 
from Cameran et al., (2016) because we compare accounting conservatism practices before 
and after a firm is mandated to adopt a new audit firm.  
 In this paper we directly test the auditor expertise/entrenchment hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between audit tenure and conditional conservatism. Evidence 
consistent with the auditor entrenchment hypothesis would suggest that firms with longer 
audit tenures that were mandated to change audit firm would increase their level of 
conservatism because a longer client-partner relationship may encourage auditors to give a 
more favorable audit opinion than is justified. Evidence consistent with the auditor expertise 
hypothesis would suggest that longer audit tenures improve auditor specific knowledge and 
MAFR reduces conservatism levels. 
As suggested above, studies that examine the relationship between audit tenure and audit 
quality provide mixed result. We test whether the type of audit switch can influence audit 




Non-Big4 auditors using earnings management as a proxy for audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Becker et al., 1998; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Behn et al., 2008; Lisic et al., 2015). There are 
three reasons why Big4 accounting firms have higher audit quality compared to Non-Big4 
firms. First, Big4 firms have developed audit systems and accumulated accounting 
knowledge over decades; thus, Big4 auditors have established systems and well trained staff. 
Second, Big4 auditors are not as income dependent on large clients as Non-Big4. Therefore, 
Big-4 firms are less likely to impair their independence to satisfy clients. Finally, Big4 audit 
firms have incentives to protect their reputation and to enhance their public image to avoid 
litigation risk (DeAngelo, 1981; Basu et al., 2001). In this study, we consider there will be a 
positive effect on audit quality after firms are audited by Big4 audit firms, after MAFR 
adoption.  
Chi and Weng (2014) argue that Big 4 audit firms have incentives to require clients to 
practice in conservative accounting in order to minimize possible litigation risk and 
reputation damage. On the other hand, increased conservatism may raise the probability for 
incumbent audit firms to be switched due to understated performance (DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998). Cano-Rodriguez (2010) finds that a firm’s conservatism is associated 
with audit switch type, more specifically with Big4 / Non-Big4 auditor switches. This 
evidence is consistent with Arthur’s (2017 et al.) study showing that audit partner rotation 
can enhance audit quality but only when both the incoming audit partner and the audit firm 
are industry specialists. Therefore, overall, we expect MAFR’s negative effect on audit quality 
can be mitigated by Big4 auditor supervision. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of our first hypothesis. Due to the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and numerous financial defaults, the South Korea government introduced 
the mandatory audit partner rotation policy in 2000. The introduction of MAPR is based on 
the entrenchment hypothesis suggesting that longer audit tenure creates a collusive 
relationship between audit firms and clients; thus, impairing independence. The Korean 
government believed that reducing the audit tenure of audit partners would reduce the 
potential for collusion between audit partners and clients. However, during the MAPR period, 
the Korean government discovered numerous instances of financial mismanagement that 
lead to high profile financial collapses. Because of public pressure, the Korean government 
became the first country to adopt MAFR since the passage of SOX in 2002. The reason Korea 




rule as opposed to their audit partner under MAPR, audit quality would improve more 
significantly under MAFR based on the belief that a "fresh look" would have the highest 
possible probability of reducing the potential for collusion between auditors and clients.  
    Whilst the South Korean government based its decision to implement MAFR on the 
entrenchment hypothesis, a change in the auditor-client relationship has the potential to 
have a negative effect on conditional accounting conservatism in the initial stages of audit 
engagements. Newly appointed auditors are likely to lack client specific knowledge, in 
particular about their client’s internal control system and operational processes. Hence, new 
auditors that lack client knowledge are more likely to rely on managers’ information in 
preparation of financial reporting which creates an environment for opportunistic behavior 
and aggressive reporting; thus reducing accounting conservatism levels. Previous studies 
show that audit rotation has led to a deterioration of audit quality based on earnings 
management proxies (Chen et al., 2008; Heninger, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002; Richardson et 
al., 2002; Piot and Janin, 2007; Chi and Huang 2005; Chi et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2014; 
Kwon et al., 2015). Further, there is evidence that firms are more likely to have a propensity 
to issue a going concern audit opinion after auditor rotation (Carey and Simnett 2006). These 
studies suggest that the loss of cumulative audit knowledge has a negative influence on audit 
quality, and the loss of this knowledge does not justify mandatory firm rotation. Given that 
conservatism and earnings management are proxies for accounting quality based on upside 
opportunity and downside risk, we would expect to find that levels of conditional 
conservatism deteriorate in a similar manner to earnings management after the adoption of 
MAFR. Based on the above, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s level of conditional conservatism is likely to decrease after mandatory 
audit firm rotation. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Next, we directly test the auditor expertise hypothesis by testing whether increased audit 
tenure increases/decreases audit quality. MAFR was established based on the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The entrenchment hypothesis suggests that prolonged audit-client relationships 
are more likely to increase the potential for collusion between auditor and clients and 
encourage auditors to impair their independence. Therefore, directly testing the influence of 




the appropriateness of MAFR. There are two possible scenarios. Firstly, firms with longer 
audit client partner relations may develop a relationship where the auditor becomes 
dependent on their client and become less likely to scrutinize audit quality. As a result, the 
implementation of MAFR on firms with longer audit client relationships would demonstrate 
improvements in their levels of conservatism after the adoption of MAFR. Second, longer 
client relationship exists because of a mutually beneficial relationship between client and 
auditors, more specifically, the client retains the auditor for a longer tenure because the 
auditor has a developed cumulative accounting knowledge for a specific client, as a result, 
the MAFR rule would have an incrementally more negative effect on conservatism for firms 
with longer audit tenures. 
MAFR was established by the Korean government based on the assumption that a ‘fresh 
look’ has the potential to improve audit quality. However, the majority of recent studies have 
reported that audit tenure positively influences audit quality, supporting the auditor 
expertise hypothesis. Furthermore, using earnings management as a proxy for accounting 
quality, Kwon et al., (2014) find evidence that MAFR in Korea has been detrimental to 
cumulative auditor knowledge. Based on these discussions and the recent findings above, we 
develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The incremental effect of audit tenure on conditional conservatism decreases after 
MAFR. 
    
III. Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample consists of listed Korean firms registered on the Korean stock exchange. 
Financial and non-financial data is collected from the KIS-VALUE, TS-2000, and DataGuide 
database systems. In South Korea, MAPR was adopted on a voluntary firm-by-firm basis from 
2000 and is still ongoing. Because firms adopted MAFR on a firm-by-firm basis, we hand 
collect data and allocate firms to samples accordingly. The sample is divided into three 
different sub-samples. Our group of interest, MAFR, constitutes firms that mandatorily 
rotated their auditors from 2006-2009. The first benchmark group of interest, MAPR, 
consists of the same MAFR firms that were only subject to mandatory “audit partner” 
rotation during 2000-2005. Our second benchmark group consists of firms that have rotated 





<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
The MAFR and MAPR samples are the same firms in periods before and after policy 
implementation. Figure 2 shows our sample decomposition. MAPR are two 3 fixed year 
periods dependent on when an auditor was hired by a firm. The MAFR period varies from 
2006-2009 dependent on the period of MAPR adoption. If a firm adopted MAPR in 2000.01, 
the second MAPR period would begin in 2003.01 and end in 2005.12. Thus, MAFR would last 
4 years from 2006-2009. However, if a firm adopted MAPR in 2003, the firm would 
experience MAFR in 2009 only. We believe this careful decomposition of observations into 
target and benchmark samples is necessary. Simply comparing two samples before and after 
2006 is likely to lead to bias results. We believe this approach adds robustness because we 
can compare the same firms in different periods dependent on audit firm rotation policy. In 
our analysis MAPR are practiced in two different 3 year periods. For brevity we disentangle 
the effect of both MAPR periods in our additional analysis section. For completeness, we 
mention that the levels of conservatism for both 3 year MAPR periods are indifferent.   
 
<Insert table 1 here> 
 
Panel A, Table 1 illustrates the sample selection process. After excluding financial firms, 
664 firms were subject to some form of auditor rotation from 2000 to 2010. We exclude 154 
firms with no financial data. We exclude an additional 20 foreign based firms because their 
audit infrastructure and corporate governance structures are different to Korean firms. 
Finally, we exclude firms that adopted MAFR in 2010. We exclude these firms because only 
19 firms adopted the policy in this period. Furthermore, auditors were less likely to impair 
their independence knowing that new policies would be implemented with the introduction 
of IFRS in 2010. Overall, 334 firms adopt the MAPR policy, and then subsequently adopt 
MAFR. 144 firms are voluntary adopters of the audit firm rotation policy, the VOLR sample. 
Panel B shows MAFR firm adoption by year. The table shows that 71, 58, 100, 105 firms 
mandatorily rotated their auditors in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. The initial 
period a firm adopted MAFR would depend on the period a firm adopted MAPR. Early 
adopters of MAPR became early adopters of MAFR by default. Panel C illustrates firms by 
industry. Overall, the results suggest that the sample is normally distributed. The highest 
number of rotations occurred in the metal industry, 43 rotations, followed by the electrical 




3.2 Research Design 
We use the reverse regression model suggested in Basu (1997) and the accrual-based 
model suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to examine whether the adoption of the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy is associated with an incremental increase in 
accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism requires the asymmetric verification of 
earnings compared to losses (Basu et al, 2001). Thus, firms with more conservative reporting 
practices can report more reliable earnings for the current period and are more likely to 
report higher earnings for the future. Earnings quality refers to the ability of reported 
earnings to predict a company’s future earnings. Hence, higher earnings quality is 
significantly associated with audit quality. Auditors would prefer to see conservative 
reporting than aggressive reporting to reduce potential audit risk. Thus, firms with 
conservative accounting practices can be considered as demonstrating higher audit quality 
because these conservative reporting practices can significantly restrict managers’ 
opportunistic behavior. Given that conditional conservatism reduces downside risk, we 
believe conditional conservatism is a felicitous proxy for audit quality in the mandatory 
rotation setting (Basu et al., 2001; Chung et al., 2003; Francis and Wang, 2008). In the Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) model, TACC are a firm's total accruals divided by prior year total 
assets. CFO is cash flow from operation divided prior year total assets. DCFO is a dummy 
variable that is one if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise. The interaction term DCFO*CFO is 
represented by BS_CC, a proxy to capture conditional conservatism. In the Basu (1997) 
model, our variable of interest, Basu_CC represents the conservatism interaction term 
DRET*CFO. EAR is net income deflated by previous year total assets, RET is 12 months 
cumulative stock return, D_RET is a dummy variable that is 1 if cumulative stock returns are 
negative, 0 otherwise.  
Our research design expands Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model and Basu (1997) models 
to incorporate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation. We compare the accounting 
conservatism of the MAFR sample with the two benchmark groups, the MAPR and VOLR 
samples when appropriate. In testing our hypothesis, we estimate equations (1) and (2) to 
measure the contemporaneous relation between accruals (earnings) and operating cash 
flows (12 months cumulative stock return) for Ball and Shivakumar measure (Basu measure). 
Therefore, apart from the predicted interaction effect between the sign of operating cash 
flow (stock return) and the extent of accruals (earnings), we also include the additional 
interaction term with ROT, to capture the effect of contemporaneous audit firm rotation. ROT 




of interest in both models are CC*ROT. A statistically significant positive association would 
suggest that MAFR increased accounting conservatism consistent with the auditor 
entrenchment hypothesis. A negative relation would suggest that MAFR decreased 
conservatism practices consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. An insignificant 
relation suggests MAFR had no effect on accounting conservatism.  
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
Basu (1997) model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (2) 
 
Dependent Variables 
TACC : Total accruals / prior year total assets 
EAR : Earnings (Net Income) / Prior year total assets 
Variable of Interest 
CC*ROT 
Independent Variables 
DCFO: Dummy variable that is one if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise 
CFO: Cash flow from operation / prior year total assets 
ROT: Dummy variable that is one if MAFR, 0 otherwise 
RET: Cumulative stock returns for 12 months  
DRET: Dummy variable that is 1 if cumulative stock returns are negative (-), 0 otherwise 
 
Next, we examine the influence of audit tenure on conservatism and the incremental effect 
of audit tenure on conditional conservatism increases/decreases after MAFR. In South Korea 
audit firms have experienced tenures ranging from 6 to 25 years for the MAFR sample and 6 
years for the MAPR sample. To test the auditor expertise hypothesis, in equation (3) and (4), 
we add the dummy variable AUDPER, a dummy variable that is 1 if audit period is longer 
than 8 years, 0 otherwise. There are three reasons that we use 8 years’ tenure for the 
comparison. First, the average audit tenure before MAFR is 9.616 years and the cumulative 
ratio of 6, 7, 8 years occupy slightly over 50% (See Table 4). Thus, using an 8 year tenure 
facilitates our comparison for two similar sample sizes. Second, the 3 year auditor retention 
regime became in effect from 1997. Before the regime, firms were allowed to rotate their 
auditors frequently. After the rule was established firms were required to retain their 
auditors. This policy allows us to compare firms with longer audit tenures before the 'auditor 
retention rule' and shorter tenures when the 'auditor retention rule' was in effect. Finally, it 




with an auditor if it were not for accounting policy changes, thus we can directly test auditor 
expertise/entrenchment hypothesis. In our additional analysis, we repeat the same analysis 
after replacing AUDPER with two additional dummy variables indicating tenure lengths 
greater than 9 and 10 years for robustness. 
 The interaction term CC*AUDPER compares the levels of conservatism of firms with 
tenures of longer than 8 years compared to those with less than a 8 year tenure. A positive 
CC*AUDPER suggests that as audit tenure increases, so does a firm’s conservatism. The 
variable CC*ROT*AUDPER is an interaction variable that compares the conservatism levels 
of firms that adopted MAFR after audit tenure of 8+ years against the remainder of our 
sample. Based on the auditor entrenchment hypothesis, firms from this group are most likely 
to have developed a close relationship with auditors and are more likely to impair their 
independence or develop a collusive relationship. A negative coefficient would be consistent 
with the auditor expertise hypothesis. A positive coefficient would be consistent with the 
auditor entrenchment hypothesis, suggesting that a fresh look improves audit quality. 
 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 + 𝛼6𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  (3) 
         𝛼7𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝛼8𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
Basu (1997) model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  (4) 
        𝛽7𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝛽8𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
Dependent Variables 
TACC : Total accruals / prior year total assets 
EAR : Earnings (Net Income) / Prior year total assets 




DCFO: Dummy variable that is one if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise 
CFO: Cash flow from operation / prior year total assets 
ROT: Dummy variable that is one if MAPR, 0 otherwise 
RET: Cumulative stock returns for 12 months  
DRET: Dummy variable that is 1 if cumulative stock returns are negative (-), 0 otherwise 





Finally, in equations (5) and (6) we test whether audit switch types affect audit quality 
after MAFR. To examine whether audit switch types influence conservatism, we add a 
dummy variable, SWITCH that takes the value one if switch type is from Non-Big4 to Big4. 
The remainder of the sample are the remaining audit switch types, Big4 to Big4, Big4 to Non-
Big4, and Non-Big4; these switch types take a value of 0. Given the extensive literature 
suggesting the superior audit quality of Big4 auditors, we expect the interaction term 
CC*ROT*SWITCH to be positive. The results would suggest that firms that were audited by a 
Big4 audit firm after MAFR demonstrate an incremental increase in accounting conservatism 
compared to the previous period (MAPR) when the firm was under the supervision of a Non-
Big4 auditor.  
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 +            (5) 
         𝛼6𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝛼8𝐵𝑆_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
Basu (1997) model 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +           (6) 
        𝛽7𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝛽8𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑢_𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
Dependent Variables 
TACC : Total accruals / prior year total assets 
EAR : Earnings (Net Income) / Prior year total assets 
 




DCFO: Dummy variable that is one if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise 
CFO: Cash flow from operation / prior year total assets 
ROT: Dummy variable that is one if MAFR, 0 otherwise 
RET: Cumulative stock returns for 12 months  
DRET: Dummy variable that is 1 if cumulative stock returns are negative (-), 0 otherwise 





IV. Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
For mean(median) difference test purposes, we calculate C scores and G scores to proxy 
for firm-level conditional conservatism (based on the Basu 1997); C and G scores are 
calculated by adding firm-specific characteristics (firm size, market to book ratio, leverage) 
each year to our regression (See Khan and Watts, 2009). C scores represent conditional 
conservatism with regard to bad news recognition. G scores represent conservatism with 
regard to good news recognition. Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics and mean 
(median) difference tests comparing the levels of conservatism of MAFR and MAPR samples. 
The results of interest are included in column Diff MAFR-MAPR. We find lower conservatism 
levels for MAFR firms compared to MAPR using C score. The results suggest that firms that 
adopted MAFR reduced their levels of accounting conservatism. We find insignificant results 
using the G score. For brevity, we only show MAFR vs MAPR results, but the C score is also 
found to be lower for MAFR compared to VLOR. Panel B illustrates Pearson correlations. We 
find a negative relation between earnings and the dummy variable Basu_CC*ROT. This 
evidence is consistent with firms adopting MAFR having lower conservatism compared to 
the remainder of the sample. The negative relation between BS_CC*ROT and accruals have 
identical implications. Overall, the results suggest that accounting quality declines after the 
adoption of MAFR. 
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
In Table 3, we compare the conditional conservatism of the MAFR sample with our two 
benchmark samples MAPR and VOLR using a dummy variable approach where ROT takes 
the value of 1 when a firm adopts MAFR. 0 represents the MAPR sample in the MAFR vs 
MAPR test. 0 represents the VOLR sample in the MAFR vs VOLR test. Our primary variable of 
interest for the Ball and Shivakumar measure, BS_CC*ROT is negatively associated with 
conservative accounting for MAFR vs MAPR test (-0.535), statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Our results suggest that the mandatory audit firm rotation policy decreased accounting 
conservatism, hence audit quality. Moreover, we find similar results for the MAFR vs VOLR 




ameliorate transitory changes in operating cash flow with accruals compared to the MAFR 
sample. The variable of interest in the Basu (1997) model measure is Basu_CC*ROT. 
Basu_CC*ROT has a negative sign for the MAFR-MAPR comparison (-0.075), statistically 
significant at the 1% level. When we compare MAFR with VOLR, we find that VOLR firms 
practice statistically significantly higher levels of conservatism (5% level of significance). 
Therefore, overall, we find evidence that conditional conservatism has decreased after 
mandatory audit firm rotation, allowing us to accept our first hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
practice of conservatism of firms subjected to MAFR is lower than that of firms that 
voluntarily rotated their auditors. These results suggest that the objective of the Korean 
government to improve audit quality under the auditor entrenchment hypothesis was not 
well specified. Our results are consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. 
 
<Insert table 3 here> 
 
Next, we examine the influence of audit tenure on conditional conservatism. We provide 
details from 1982 because the free auditor engagement rule that allowed firms to 
independently select their auditor became effective from 1982. Before 1982, under the 
auditor designation rule, a firm was not independently permitted to select an auditor. Panel 
A gives details about the influence of consecutive audit tenure on our sample. In Table 4, 
Panel A, we show that the majority of firms regularly change auditors from 1982 to 2010. 
Firms that retain an audit firm for 8 years or less make up 54.19% of our sample. After 12 
years of audit tenure, almost 83% of firms rotate their auditors. Panel B tests the auditor 
expertise vs auditor entrenchment hypothesis. AUDPER is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the audit period is longer than 8 years, 0 otherwise. The interaction terms BS_CC* 
AUDPER and Basu_CC*AUDPER compare the level of conservatism for firms with audit 
tenures of more than 8 years with firms with tenures of 8 or less. We find firms with audit 
tenures of more than 8 years are statistically significantly more conservative than firms with 
shorter tenures at the 5% (BS_CC coefficient 0.54) and 1% (Ball_CC 0.086) levels. Next, we 
compare the effect of MAFR on audit firms that retain their auditors for more than 8 years 
with the remainder of our sample. The variables of interest are BS_CC*ROT*AUDPER and 
BS_CC*ROT*AUDPER. For both models we find a negative relation, statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The results suggest that firms with audit tenures of 8 year or longer that adopt 
MAFR have lower levels of conservatism relative to the remainder of our sample. Overall, the 
results suggest conservatism has incrementally decreased for MAFR sample firms with 




suggest that the loss of accumulated knowledge can have a negative influence on 
conservatism. This evidence is consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. We do not 
compare MAFR with VOLR because the VOLR sample are firms that frequently rotate their 
auditors (every 3 year); hence are not subject to mandatory audit firm rotation. 
  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Next, we examine the effect of 'switch' type on conservatism. To examine the influence of 
audit firm switch type on conservatism, we include the dummy variable SWITCH, a variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a firm switches from Non-Big4 to a Big4 audit firm after MAFR. 
Firms that switch from Big4 to Non-Big4, Non-Big4 to Big4 and Big4 to Non-Big4 take the 
value of 0. Table 5, Panel A shows the frequency of audit switch type. The most frequent 
switch type is Big4 to Big4 (43.31%). Our group of interest, firms that switch from Non-Big4 
to Big4 auditors make up 25.45% of our sample. Firms that switch to Non-Big4 comprise of 
31.14%. Our variable of interest CC*ROT*SWITH is positive for the MAFR VS MAPR sample. 
We find a 10% significance level for the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model and a 5% level 
of the Basu model. The results are consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. Firms 
audited by Non-Big4 auditors that switch to Big4 auditors increase their levels of accounting 
conservatism. The results are consistent with previous literature and knowledge-superiority 
of Big4 auditors. We find that the conservatism level for MAFR sample is indifferent to firms 
that voluntary rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 auditors. These results suggest that whilst 
MAFR has decreased audit quality on the whole because of a decline in firm specific 
knowledge, firms that switch from Non-Big4 to Big4 auditors demonstrate higher levels of 
conservatism because Big4 auditors are more likely to demand conservative accounting 
practices.  
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
V. Additional Analysis 
5.1 Mandatory audit partner sample division 
To identify the effect of different incentives on audit quality, we divide MAPR into two 3 
year sub-samples to capture the incentives of auditors in different periods. In period MAPR1 




under a different partner. In period MAPR2, auditors are less likely to impair their 
independence because auditors would be aware of the introduction of MAFR in the next 
period. Therefore, based on the entrenchment hypotheses, it is possible to predict lower 
accounting conservatism levels for the MAPR1 sample compared to MAPR2. On the other 
hand, based on the expertise hypotheses, audit partner rotation may decrease audit quality 
due to the loss of client specific knowledge. Table 6 shows that audit quality measured by 
conditional accounting conservatism increases from the first 3 year period, MAPR1 to 
MAPR2 the second 3 year period. The results suggest that longer tenures and the potential 
to transfer client specific knowledge improve client specific knowledge (expertise) and 
increases conservatism. We find no evidence of audit partners impairing their independence. 
5.2 Tenure robustness tests  
We conduct sensitivity analysis to test ‘longer’ audit tenure effect on conservatism for the 
Ball and Shivakumar and Basu models, (3) and (4). Specifically, the AUDPER variable was 
replaced by two additional dummy variables indicating tenure lengths greater than 9 and 10 
years. Untabulated results are similar with earlier results, using both conservatism measures. 
Cons*AUDPER shows a significantly positive sign, suggesting that audit quality improves 
with longer audit tenure, consistent with the auditor expertise hypotheses. On the other 
hand, Cons*ROT*AUDPER consistently show negative signs, suggesting that conservatism 
has incrementally decreased for MAFR firms with longer previous audit tenure due to the 
loss of accumulated knowledge. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
The South Korean government implemented the mandatory audit partner policy in 2000 
to increase public confidence in accounting based on the auditor entrenchment hypothesis. 
However, due to concurrent high profile bankruptcies when MAPR was in effect, the 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy was introduced in 2006. MAFR was mandated under 
the premise that increased safeguards against familiarity threats would reduce the 
possibility of collusion, hence increase audit quality. We find that after the adoption of MAFR, 
the same firm is more likely to reduce its levels of conservatism compared to previous 
periods when MAPR was mandated. Furthermore, we find that the levels of conservatism of 
firms that voluntarily rotate their audit firms is higher than firms that were mandated to 




conditional conservatism in South Korea. Conditional conservatism is the recognition of bad 
news in a timelier manner compared to good news or ‘worst case scenario reporting’. Our 
study suggests that the Korean government’s policy to increase audit quality with the 
implementation of MAFR was not successful overall. 
    We find evidence consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. We find that longer 
audit tenure increases a firm’s conservatism practices. Moreover, we find that firms with 
long term audit-partner client relationships that are mandated to rotate their auditors 
practice lower conservatism compared to all other firms suggesting a reduction in firm 
specific knowledge decreases conservatism. However, we find that auditor switch type has 
the potential to influence the levels of a firm’s conservatism. Firms that rotate from Non-Big4 
to Big4 auditors increase their conservatism practices compared to other switch types. The 
results suggest that whilst MAFR leads to the loss of client specific knowledge, the 
knowledge-superiority of Big4 auditors can have a mediating influence on audit quality. 
Therefore, whilst we find, MAFR is not effective, we find some positive effects of MAFR on 
audit quality based on audit switch type. A limitation of this paper is that the legal and 
political systems of South Korea are different to the E.U. and the U.S.A., economies where 
mandatory audit rotation are or being considered as policies to improve audit quality. 
However, given potential legislative and geographical differences, we find overwhelming 
evidence against the auditor entrenchment hypothesis based on South Korea’s unique 
experiment.  
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